

COR-0314 ✓

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16 January 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Exploitation of CORONA Product

25X1 1. In pursuance of your instructions, a briefing at HTAUTOMAT was held 6 January 1959 for the authorized representatives of the Air Force, Army, and Navy. [] gave the security briefing. Mr. Lundahl and his staff provided a complete briefing on the equipment and procedures for the processing and exploitation of CORONA material as planned to date.

2. In his briefing Mr. Lundahl made clear the importance which you attach to joint procurement of equipment wherever possible in order to effect economies.

3. We foresee two types of clearance problems: one in the immediate future and one at a later date. These will be discussed in turn.

Purchase of Equipments

4. The purchase of equipments by the Services presumes that eventually there will come into existence centers within which satellite photography can be exploited in a secure manner. The current plans of the three Services for centers are as follows:

a. Air Force: a center at SAC and at Headquarters USAF (or at ACIC).

b. Navy: a center at Navy/PIC, Suitland.

c. Army: no separate center; instead, participation within the center at HTAUTOMAT. (In this regard, it should be noted that HTAUTOMAT is already, by grace of the Army, utilizing certain Army equipments. In the long run, it is the intention of the Army to establish a capability for the exploitation of CHALICE

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and possibly CORONA photography in a cell at the Army Map Service. Accordingly, even though the Army does not at this time anticipate establishing a separate center for exploitation of CORONA photography, they are very much interested in the identification of necessary equipments for later utilization. It may be that the Army may even be able now, as it has done in the past, to ease the burden on HTAUTOMAT by the purchase and loan of certain equipments.)

Recommendation on Clearances for
Procurement of Equipment

5. That authorization* be given for clearing up to six officers from SAC, six from Headquarters USAF, six from the Navy, and three officers from Army, the foregoing officers to be involved in procurement and developing procedures and plans for the establishment of centers and the utilization of the CORONA product when it becomes available.

Activation of Centers for Exploitation
of CORONA Product

6. It is understood that for Mr. Lundahl to be able to handle efficiently the CORONA product when it is available practically all of the people in his establishment will have to work with some aspect of the product. These people, as distinct from those currently engaged in the planning, would appear to require a much more limited clearance. TALENT centers under the administration of the Army, Navy, or Air Force will be faced with substantially the same problems in this regard. In approving the recommendation bearing upon procurement in paragraph 5 above, it should be kept in mind that we will in due course be overtaken by the need for substantial additional clearances.

7. In order to restrict to the minimum the essential information required by those in the TALENT centers involved in processing, rectification,

* This is in addition to the authorization already granted for two from each of the Services who have concurred in the substance of this paper.

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and mosaic construction (showing track), it is proposed that their security briefing be along the lines of the following (for the purposes of this paper such will be called a TALENT-CORONA briefing but a different code word will replace CORONA):

"You are being authorized access to materials derived from satellite reconnaissance. This fact of reconnaissance is of extraordinary sensitivity. Accordingly, you are prohibited from discussing this material except with those who have been identified to you as cleared for the same knowledge. This clearance does not give you access to any operational information."

Recommendation on Security Briefing
for Centers

8. That you approve the above security briefing statement to be signed by each person certified for working in a TALENT-CORONA center. (This is separate and distinct from those who are viewed by CORONA Security Office as requiring additional information about CORONA because they are involved in dealing with contractors, etc.)

Activation of Cleared Billets

9. At the moment, estimates of the Services as to the number of people who will need to be cleared for CORONA with a security briefing as noted above in paragraph 7 are as follows:

- a. Army: 45.
- b. Navy: 75.
- c. SAC: 150. Headquarters USAF: 150. (AFCIN is currently engaged in reorganization, and it is uncertain at this time whether the second center will be established at Arlington Hall or ACIC.)

It is recognized that there are many uncertainties ahead in this project; accordingly, a control from the project needs to be exercised in the activation of cleared billets.

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10. Recommendation: It is recommended:

a. That for planning purposes and for preparation of procedures to handle the CORONA product the number of billets estimated by the Services in the foregoing paragraph be approved (all would already have had TALENT clearance).

b. That the CIA TALENT Control Officer in coordination with the CIA TALENT Security Officer, the Security Officer DPD-DD/P, the Director, Photographic Intelligence Center, and the representatives of the Army, Navy, and Air Force be responsible for activating the clearances approved in phase with the requirements arising from the arrival and installation of equipment and the arrival of CORONA materials for handling.

11. It is now envisaged that when microscopic segments of CORONA photography will have been enlarged to the size of 8 x 10" or larger in the form of duplicate positive, duplicate negative, or prints, they will not be distinguished as coming from satellite reconnaissance and different from today's TALENT material. Accordingly, CORONA materials in these forms, whether subject to examination by additional PIs (i.e., outside of the centers) or appearing in reports or any display would not require a TALENT-CORONA clearance for handling. Such materials would then flow in the TALENT system as CHESS. This fact should make it possible to keep the total TALENT-CORONA clearances among the consumers to a very small proportion of the total existing TALENT clearances.



JAMES Q. REBER
CIA TALENT Control Officer

cc: OACSI TCO (cy 3)
ONI TCO (cy 4)
AFCIN TCO (cy 5)

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Memorandum for DD/P, Subject: Exploitation of CORONA Product,
Dated 16 January 1959, from CIA TCO.

CONCURRENCES:

[Redacted Signature Box]

ARTHUR C. LUNDAHL
Director, PIC

Date 16 JAN 1959

SIGNED

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM
Dir Admin DPD-DD/P

Date 16 JAN 1959

[Redacted Signature Box]

CIA TSO

Date 16 JAN 1959

[Redacted Signature Box]

SO DPD-DD/P

Date 16 JAN 1959

APPROVED:

[Redacted Signature Box]

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director (Plans)

Date 20 FEB 1959

cc: Director PIC (cy 6)
CIA TSO (cy 7) -
Dir Admin DPD-DD/P (cy 8)
SO DPD-DD/P (cy 9)

DPD-DD/P: JQReber:cw
CIA TCO (cys 1&2)
DD/P chrono (cy 10) ✓

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